Alternate Possibilities & Moral Responsibility

Harry G. Frankfurt (1969)
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Conclusion
Sub-conclusion
Key move
Counterexample
Premise
Branch A: Coercion
Branch B: Frankfurt Case
Conclusion The Principle of Alternate Possibilities is false
PAP says a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. Frankfurt argues this is mistaken. A person may be fully responsible even though he could not have done otherwise — because the impossibility of alternatives may play no role whatsoever in explaining why he acted as he did. In plain terms: PAP says "no alternatives → no responsibility." Frankfurt's reply: what matters is not whether you had other options, but whether the lack of options is actually the reason you did what you did. If you would have done exactly the same thing for your own reasons regardless, then the missing alternatives are irrelevant to whether you're responsible. PAP should be replaced: you're off the hook only if the sole reason you acted was that you had no choice.
§§ I–III · Coercion Analysis
Sub-conclusion A Coercion does not excuse via PAP
PAP's plausibility comes largely from its association with the idea that coercion excludes moral responsibility. But careful analysis shows that the doctrine of coercion is not a version of PAP. What excuses the coerced person is not the absence of alternatives — it's the fact that the coercive force actually accounts for the action.
Key Distinction Two kinds of "could not have done otherwise"
(i) Cases where circumstances both cause the action and eliminate alternatives (coercion, hypnosis, compulsion). (ii) Cases where circumstances are sufficient conditions for the action but do not actually produce or impel it. This separates the modal question (could he have done otherwise?) from the explanatory question (what actually led him to act?).
Jones₁ Threat has no coercive effect
Jones₁ already decided to act and does so regardless of any threat. The threat exerts no effective force. He is responsible — but this isn't a counterexample to PAP, because the threat didn't actually deprive him of alternatives.
Jones₂ Stampeded by the threat
Jones₂ forgets his own earlier decision and acts entirely out of fear. He is not morally responsible — but the reason is that the coercion actually explains his action, not merely that he lacked alternatives.
Jones₃ Acts on own decision despite irresistible threat
Jones₃ had already decided to act for his own reasons. The threat was irresistible, but in fact he acted on the basis of his prior decision, not the threat. He could not have done otherwise, yet he is morally responsible — the threat played no role in bringing about his action.
Key Insight The dilemma about Jones₃ dissolves PAP's link to coercion
If Jones₃ was not coerced (because the coercion didn't account for his action), then coercion excuses only when it explains the action — inability to do otherwise is beside the point. If Jones₃ was coerced, then being coerced doesn't automatically excuse, and what matters is whether the coercion accounts for the action. Either way, the mere absence of alternatives does no moral work.
§§ IV–V · The Frankfurt Case
Sub-conclusion B The Black/Jones₄ case is a direct counterexample to PAP
The scenario constructs a case in which a person cannot do otherwise yet is morally responsible. The inability to do otherwise is explanatorily idle — it can be "subtracted" from the situation without changing anything about how or why the person acted.
Counterexample The Black/Jones₄ scenario
Black wants Jones₄ to perform a certain action. He watches and waits. If Jones₄ shows signs of deciding to do it, Black does nothing. If Jones₄ shows signs of deciding otherwise, Black intervenes to ensure Jones₄ does it anyway. As it happens, Jones₄ decides entirely on his own. Black never intervenes.
Linked premises
Premise Jones₄ cannot do otherwise
Black's readiness to intervene guarantees the outcome. Whatever Jones₄'s initial preferences, the action Black wants will be performed. Jones₄ has no alternative.
Premise Jones₄ is morally responsible
Jones₄ acted entirely on his own reasons. Black's presence played no role at all in leading him to act. Everything happened just as it would have without Black's presence. It would be unreasonable to excuse Jones₄ on the basis of a fact that had no part in bringing about his action.
Inference Therefore PAP has a counterexample
Someone is morally responsible for what he did even though he could not have done otherwise. PAP requires that responsibility entails the ability to do otherwise. This case violates that. PAP is false.
General Moral Inability to do otherwise is explanatorily irrelevant
The inability to avoid doing something may be a sufficient condition of having done it, but it may play no role in the explanation of why one did it. When it plays no explanatory role, it is "gratuitous" to assign it weight in the moral assessment. The circumstances making it impossible to do otherwise can be subtracted from the situation without changing how or why the person acted.
§ VI · Both branches converge
Revised Principle A person is not morally responsible for what he has done if he did it only because he could not have done otherwise
The word "only" does the critical work. The person who acts as he does because he wanted to — and who would have acted that way regardless of whether alternatives existed — is responsible. The person who acts solely on account of his inability to act differently is not. Frankfurt argues this revision preserves the resources that incompatibilists thought they got from PAP: even under determinism, one still needs to show that the person performed the action only because of the causal determinants.
Anticipated Objection
Objection Jones₃ / Jones₄ can do otherwise in some sense
One might object that Jones₃ could defy the threat and accept the penalty, or that Jones₄ could begin deciding otherwise (triggering Black's intervention). So they can do otherwise, and these aren't genuine counterexamples.
Frankfurt's Reply This isn't the sense of "could have done otherwise" that PAP uses
Jones₃ can defy the threat only at terrible cost; his knowledge that he faces an intolerable penalty doesn't mean he can perform a different action in the relevant sense. Jones₄'s case is cleaner: beginning to decide otherwise only triggers intervention, so the outcome is the same regardless. The ability to initiate a sequence that would be overridden is not the ability to perform a different action.